Wyoming Law Journal
Volume 13

Number 3

Article 9

December 2019

Liability of the Survivor for Payment of an Obligation Secured by
Entireties Property
Donal M. Holdaway

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj

Recommended Citation
Donal M. Holdaway, Liability of the Survivor for Payment of an Obligation Secured by Entireties Property,
13 WYO. L.J. 267 (1959)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj/vol13/iss3/9

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Wyoming Law Journal by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

NOTES

determine whether any applicant for a license to practice any form
of the healing art is sufficiently well informed concerning those
sciences on which the art is based to justify his examination by one
of the state boards authorized to issue such a license as the applicant desires.
The basic science statutes are supplementary to the usual licensing
statutes and require that the applicant obtain, as a prerequisite to securing
a license in a particular field of the healing art, a certificate showing that
he is proficient in certain basic sciences, usually anatomy, physiology, pathology, chemistry, and bacteriology. In other words, in these states the
demonstration by the applicant of his proficiency in these basic sciences
does not entitle him to practice one of these arts; it merely entitles him to
appear before a professional board of his choice for an examination in his
field of specialization. In preventing the licensure of unqualified persons,
they have worked well.6 9
The American Medical Association has drawn up a Uniform Basic
70
Science Statute which it recommends to the various state legislatures.
In this statute "the healing art" is defined. The members of the examining board may not be actively engaged in the practice of the healing art
but must be members of faculties of state educational institutions.
The effectiveness of this type of statute is illustrated by a survey which
showed that a group of 8,960 persons have been examined by basic science
examining boards in the several states which have adopted the law; only
12% of those being examined for doctor of medicine failed the examination and were unable to apply for a license to practice. Of the second
largest group to be examined, osteopaths, 41% failed. In the third group,
7
composed of chiropractors 74% failed. '
It is apparent that the adoption of such a statute would go far in
protecting the public from incompetent, poorly educated practitioners in
any healing art. A similar law would certainly be worthy of study by
Wyoming legislators.
WILLIAM
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LIABILITY OF THE SURVIVOR FOR PAYMENT OF AN
OBLIGATION SECURED BY ENTIRETIES PROPERTY
Among the difficult problems arising from the holding of property as
tenants by the entirety is the liability of a deceased tenant's estate for an
obligation secured by a mortgage on the property at the time of his death.
The survivor now holds all of the property alone; should he be liable for
the entire secured obligation, or should the estate of the deceased be
held liable for at least half of the obligation? There is a split of authority
on this point which is discussed by the Delaware court in the recent case of
69.
70.
71.

Pamphlet, Basic Science Laws, op. cit. supra note 68.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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In re Keil's Estate.] The court points out that there are two lines of cases,
one emphasizing the law surrounding the rights and obligations of those
signing a joint and several note, the other emphasizing the law relating to a
tenancy held by the entireties. The cases that have based their decisions on
the law of tenancies by the entirety have concluded that the ultimate
obligation for paying the mortgage debt rests with the survivor of the
tenancy by the entireties. The cases that speak of the obligations of the
holders of a joint and several note hold the estate liable for one-half the
obligation. The court states that both lines of cases are supported by
sound legal principles. This note will attempt an analysis of the cases to
determine which line of authority is most persuasive. It should be
emphasized that this question is one of ultimate liability since it is quite
clear where a joint and several obligation is involved, that the creditor has
2
the option of suing one or both the obligors on the note.
The origin of the mortgage involved might be considered important,
and in a case which held that the survivor was responsible for the entire
mortgage obligation the court specifically limited their holding to cases
where a purchase money mortgage is involved. 3 This holding would seem
to be sound: such a mortgage is executed in order to purchase the land
and therefore the survivor who holds all of the land should have the entire
obligation. This case, however, is the only one that has intimated that the
type of mortgage involved may be decisive in the case. There is no other
direct authority for making the distinction suggested, and there are in
fact two cases holding the survivor liable on the entire obligation where the
4
mortgages involved were not purchase money mortgages.
Whether the mortgagee is a party to the dispute has been a factor. The
court in the case of In re Keil's Estate based their decision on this point. 5
Both lines of cases were examined and the reason the court gave for choosing the one line in preference to the other was that since the dispute did
not involve the creditors and was a dispute between the surviving tenant
and the deceased tenants estate, the issues could be resolved by applying
the law surrounding a tenancy by the entirety. By applying that law, the
survivor was held liable, as the tenants held per tout et non per my with
the survivor taking the entire estate, and therefore the survivor, as sole
owner, should bear the obligation. Another case, however, which reached
the same result as Keil's Estate did involve a situation where the mortgagee
had entered the dispute.6 If the creditor enters the litigation and presents
1.
2.

3.
4.
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In re Keil's Estate, - Del _. 140 A.2d 139 (1958).
8 Am. Jur. § 519, Bills and Notes. It should be noted that the Uniform Joint
Obligations Act codifies this specific point by providing that on the death of a
joint obligor in contract, his executor or administrator (or estate) shall be bound
as such jointly and severally with the surviving obligor. Wisconsin Statutes, 113.06
(1955).
Lopez v. Lopez, ___Fla. __ 90 So.2d 456 (1956).
Ratte v. Ratte, 260 Mass. 165, 156 N.E. 870 (1927); In re Keil's Estate, supra
note 1.
Supra note 1.
In re Dell's Estate, 154 Misc. 216, 276 N.Y.S. 960 (1935).
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proof of a debt that is due, the estate would have the duty to liquidate the
debt, but this in no way determines the ultimate responsibility for the
debt where it is secured by a mortgage on a tenancy by the entireties. The
7
estate would still have rights against the survivor.
Payment of an indebtedness by one of two or more joint obligors is
for the benefit of all, and one making payment is entitled to contribution
from the others.8 With the exception of one case,9 the decisions seems to
favor the right of contribution to the obligor who discharges the mortgage
on the entireties property, and the courts have disregarded the law surrounding the tenancy by the entirety. This has been true where the estate
of the deceased tenant has paid, ° and also where the survivor has paid." t
Most of the cases which have held the survivor responsible for the entire
obligation have involved situations where the obligation has not been
paid. 12 An exception is Ratte v. Ratte, where the court held the survivor
liable on the whole obligation after he had paid it, and would not allow
contribution. 13 The reason given in the case was that the right of contribution is based on there being a common burden and, therefore no
right of contribution existed since all of the land was now held by the
survivor of the tenancy by the entirety. This decision serves to illustrate
the most significant thing in all of these cases, i.e., that if the court examines
the problem as one being based on the special nature of a tenancy held by
14
the entireties, then factors such as contribution cease to be significant.
From the analysis of the cases it seems fairly obvious that there are
few, if any, unchallenged generalizations that one can isolate and anticipate
as controlling if this problem should be litigated in a Wyoming court.
The soundest legal approach to the problem is offered in the cases where the
court considers the special nature of tenants holding by the entirety. In
the Lopez case the court says that the nature of the obligation is to be
considered in the light of the incidents of the ownership of the property
which is security for the debt: the husband and wife each own the whole
of the estate simultaneously, and the burden of the mortgage follows the
security.' 5 It is logical that the person who holds the whole of the mortgaged estate should be responsible for the entire obligation on the mortgage. Such a result is inescapable where a purchase money mortgage is
involved. It would seem only slightly less valid for any other security
interest.
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Keil's Estate, supra note 1.
Magenheimer v. Councilman, 76 Ind.App. 583, 125 N.E. 77 (1919) : Kershaws Estate,
352 Pa. 205, 42 A.2d 538 (1945).
Ratte v. Ratte, supra note 4.
Cunningham v. Cunningham, 158 Md. 372, 148 Ati. 444, 67 A.L.R. 1176 (1930);
Kershaws Estate; Magenhemier v. Councilman, supra note 8.
Dowler's Estate 368 Pa. 519, 84 A.2d 209 (1951).
Keil's Estate, supra note 1; Dell's Estate, supra note 6; Lopez v. Lopez, supra note 3.
Ratte v. Ratte, supra note 4.
It should be noted in passing that in no case has exoneration been allowed.
Annotations to 67 A.L.R. 1176.
Lopez v. Lopez, supra note 3.

270

WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

A practical approach should be noted in conclusion and that is in
the field of estate planning. Where the estate planner deals with entireties
property that bears the burden of a secured obligation he has the opportunity to provide for payment of the debt in a manner that will meet the
wishes of the tenants. The desirability of this is obvious where the first
tenant to die is the husband. It is possible by a will provision to place
the burden of paying the debt on the estate and free the widow of possible
liability. This solution was suggested in one of the cases, but the will
provision was nullified because the will turned out to be inoperative.16
An easy solution is offered if a valid will provision is made.
DONALD
16.

Cunningham v. Cunningham, supra note 10.

I.

HOLDAWAY

